The experience of developing countries over 1990-2010 indicates that commodity prices have a significant impact on fiscal outcomes. Both revenue and expenditure rise in response to commodity (import or export) price increases; the response of the fiscal deficit is ambiguous. A floating exchange rate regime only partially offsets the impact; foreign-exchange reserves do not dampen the effects. Hence, there is a strong case for fiscal hedging against commodity price shocks. Hedging instruments based on a limited set of benchmark world prices for a narrow set of commodities may suffice to realize most of the potential benefits.
I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of commodity price shocks on fiscal outcomes remains a subject of considerable controversy in both academic and policy circles. The 2007-08 boom in food and fuel prices, current indications that a second global food-price shock may be underway, and the observed volatility in commodity prices have all greatly intensified this interest. In particular, they have led to significant concerns that commodity price shocks may complicate the management of fiscal and debt policy, by increasing budget uncertainty, encouraging a procyclical fiscal policy, and threatening debt sustainability. Such concerns are especially acute in the case of low-income countries (LICs), which are relatively more exposed to commodity price shocks, and may be expected to rise further as LICs continue to integrate into international markets. As a result, there is renewed debate on whether hedging commodity shocks, through either market-based instruments or contingent official financing, would be beneficial and feasible.
1 This paper pushes the debate forward by analyzing empirically two broad, related questions.
First, is there evidence that commodity price shocks significantly influence fiscal outcomes, inducing fiscal uncertainty? Put differently, is there a prima facie case for hedging against commodity price shocks? To this end, the paper assesses the impact of commodity export and import price shocks on fiscal revenue, expenditure, social expenditure, and public debt. It performs the analysis for several different economic groupings, including LICs, middleincome countries (MICs), commodity exporters, and commodity importers.
Second, is commodity price hedging, based on derivative instruments, likely to yield significant benefits in practice? This question, in turn, raises at least five separate issues. To start, can most of the adverse impacts of commodity price shocks be mitigated by traditional policy buffers, including floating exchange rate regimes and reserve assets?
Next, effective hedging instruments will, in the foreseeable future, likely be available at a reasonable cost only for a narrow set of commodities. Will such a limited set of instruments suffice to realize most of the potential benefits from hedging?
In addition, hedging instruments will likely be tied to a limited set of benchmark world commodity prices, rather than to country-specific commodity prices. Given the implied lack of precision in insuring against country-specific shocks ("basis risk"), will it still be possible to realize significant benefits from hedging? Also important is that commodity exports and imports are influenced by shocks to not just prices, but also volumes. Are price shocks sufficiently dominant that price hedging will suffice to stabilize export revenue? Finally, commodity export and import prices may move together over time. Will such co-movements act to stabilize fiscal outcomes, reducing the importance of additional hedging?
Overall, the paper assesses the extent of fiscal exposure to commodity price shocks, and makes a case for financial hedging by the public sector. The bulk of the existing literature on commodity price volatility focuses on its growth impact, and on the pass-through of international prices into domestic prices. A few papers discuss the fiscal impact of commodity price shocks. In particular, Kaminsky (2010) documents that terms-of-trade booms are not necessarily associated with large fiscal surpluses in developing countries, reflecting the pro-cyclicality of government spending. In the same vein, Medina (2010) and Villafuerte et al. (2010) find a strong response of fiscal revenue and expenditure to commodity prices in Latin America and the Caribbean, with significant differences across countries, and Arze del Granado et al. (2010) find evidence of pro-cyclicality in social spending in developing countries. However, these analyses only covers a limited set of fiscal variables and countries, and fail to distinguish between commodity import and commodity export price shocks. Again, Cespedes and Velasco (2011) show that fiscal policy in commodity-rich nations was historically quite pro-cyclical, with the fiscal balance often deteriorating as commodity prices increased, but find evidence of reduced pro-cyclicality in the 2000s. However, their analysis only focuses on large, sustained commodity booms, rather than on commodity price changes more generally.
As for the role of hedging, the limited literature focuses on private, micro-level hedging rather than public, macro-level hedging. Among the exceptions, Borensztein et al. (2009) demonstrate the welfare gains associated with hedging against commodity price risks for commodity-exporting countries. In particular, they show that introducing hedging financing enhances domestic welfare by reducing both export income volatility, and the need to hold foreign assets as precautionary saving. Likewise, Daniel (2001) argues that many governments could benefit substantially from hedging against oil-price risk.
A related strand of the literature argues that commodity exporters or importers can insure against volatility in commodity prices not just through financial hedging, but also through policy buffers and non-financial hedging (for instance, by accumulating foreign assets, diversifying exports, and employing conservative price assumptions in the budget). Indeed, the public sector has typically relied on nonfinancial hedging. Many governments have strived to build up policy buffers, including creating fiscal space through fiscal consolidation and public debt payment. Other buffers, such as commodity stabilization fund scheme, are generally set up to deal both with the expected depletion of commodity resources and the volatility of commodity-related income. There are trade-offs between financial and nonfinancial hedging. In particular, the potential limitations of nonfinancial hedging include the need for strong institutions and efficient policy coordination (see Ossowski et al., 2008) .
Further, as stressed by Borensztein et al. (2009) , building up financial asset for precautionary motives comes at the cost of reducing consumption and welfare. The costs of financial hedging include, for instance, ill-conceived contract negotiations which lock in commodity prices lower than market trends. More fundamentally, opportunities for financial hedging are incomplete, especially over longer horizons (Becker et al., 2007) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II sets out some key stylized facts, focusing on the importance of commodity trade, and some prima facie evidence that it may influence fiscal outcomes. Section III sets out a formal empirical methodology for examining the cross-country link between fiscal outcomes and commodity prices. Section IV discusses the results. Section V examines some of the above-mentioned potential problems with price hedging. Section VI concludes.
II. STYLIZED FACTS

A. The Importance of Commodity Trade
We set the stage by briefly illustrating the importance of commodity exports and imports, and showing that this has not diminished over time. We abstract from developments over the past couple of years, since these are dominated by the possibly temporary response to the financial crisis. Since 1980, for developing countries as a whole, exports and imports have grown, not just in absolute terms, but also relative to GDP (Figure 1 ). Middle-income countries (MICs) are broadly more open than LICs. In much of the subsequent analysis, we focus on "commodity exporters" or "commodity importers", defined as those countries where commodity exports or imports account for at least 20 percent of GDP.
2 Largely by construction, these countries are significantly more open than the average developing country. Commodity trade has broadly followed the same trend as overall trade. Both commodity exports and imports have generally grown relative to GDP (Figure 2 ).
Both commodity exports and imports are significantly concentrated, with no clear trend toward an increase or decrease in specialization over time. The share of the 3 most important commodities in total commodity exports or imports has remained roughly stable since the mid-1990's ( Figure 3) . Interestingly, the mean degree of specialization appears greatest in LICs. Even for developing countries as a whole, the top 3 commodities account on average for over 40 percent of total commodity exports. This suggests that, at least for some countries, hedging on a limited number of markets might yield significant insurance against aggregate commodity-revenue fluctuations. In the aggregate, crude oil dominates developing countries' commodity exports and imports (Table 1 and Table 2 ). Other key commodities include copper, fish, coal, and iron.
Finally, commodity export and import prices are both very volatile. For developing countries as a group, the late 1990's saw a sharp decrease in commodity prices, followed by a boom for most of the 2000's, and a collapse in 2008-09 ( Figure 4) . Quantitatively, the developingcountry average annual growth rate of commodity prices exhibits over most time periods a standard deviation on the order of at least 2-3 percentage points. For individual countries, fluctuations can be much more severe: commodity export and import prices both display an overall panel standard deviation on the order of 10 percentage points.
B. Commodity Price Shocks and Fiscal Exposure
This section employs simple statistics, based on correlation analysis, to illustrate to what extent movements in commodity prices are associated with changes in fiscal variables, including revenue, expenditure, deficits, and public debt. Overall, the data suggest strong correlations between world commodity prices and fiscal outcomes (Table 3) . For instance, commodity export prices have positive, relatively large correlations with revenue / GDP, and negative correlations with debt / GDP. The correlations are even larger with respect to the prices of the 3 most important export commodities.
3 These preliminary results suggest a prima facie case that hedging against commodity price volatility may smooth fiscal adjustment.
III. METHODOLOGY
The empirical strategy involves reduced-form cross-country panel regressions. The dataset is an unbalanced annual panel, covering the period 1990-2010 and (depending on the precise variable) up to 116 countries. We focus on the extent of fiscal exposure to commodity price shocks, and adopt the following benchmark fiscal exposure equation:
The subscripts i and t denote, respectively, the country and the time period, while the subscripts x and m denote, respectively, commodity exports and imports.
denotes the percentage point change in each of the following dependent variables, in turn: (i) total revenue / GDP; (ii) total expenditure / GDP; (iii) social expenditure (on education and health) / GDP; (iv) fiscal balance (surplus) / GDP; and (v) public debt / GDP. 4 and are the country-specific, time-varying commodity (spot) export and import price indices. They are constructed based on the actual weight of each commodity in the country's export or import basket, and on the world price of that commodity. and are country-specific, time-varying weights set equal to, respectively, the share of commodity exports and imports in GDP. That is, commodity price indices are weighted by the country's total commodity exports or imports, relative to GDP. The weights are lagged to reduce endogeneity concerns.
In commodity exporters, we expect commodity export prices to be positively associated with revenue, through their impact on income taxes (and in particular profit taxes) and non-tax revenue (including royalties and production sharing agreements). The direct impact of commodity export prices on trade taxes is likely less significant, given that export taxes have been widely removed in most developing countries since the 1980s. We also expect commodity export prices to be positively associated with expenditure, including social expenditure. The magnitude of the response would optimally depend on the extent to which commodity price changes are seen as permanent, as well as whether public investment is required to take full advantage of the increased export prices. We have less definite priors on the response of the fiscal balance (surplus) and debt, although the general normative presumption is that, to the extent that the commodity price changes are seen as temporary, the fiscal balance should increase.
In commodity importers, we expect commodity import prices to be positively associated with revenue, through their direct impact on trade taxes. We also expect commodity import prices to be positively associated with expenditure, and in particular increased spending on social safety nets, or food and fuel subsidies. Again, we have less definite priors on the response of the fiscal balance and debt.
We also interact commodity prices with the following variables, to examine how they affect the impact of commodity price shocks:
1. , which denotes a country's de facto exchange rate regime. = 1 for fixed exchange rate regimes, and 0 otherwise (the classification is based on the llzetzki et al., 2009, approach) . 5 The hypothesis is that floating exchange rates may weaken the impact of commodity-price changes on revenue, for two reasons. First, floating exchange rates may dampen any impact on output. Second, in response to, say, a reduction in commodity export prices, a depreciation would act to increase revenue from trade taxes (which tend to be significant in LICs). On the other hand, floating exchange rates may magnify the impact of commodity-price changes on external debt service and the debt burden, as long as debt is denominated in a foreign currency.
2.
, which denotes a country's reserves (relative to imports). There are (at least) two competing hypotheses. First, greater reserves may allow for a smaller response of exchange rates to changes in commodity prices (and in particular to negative price shocks), reducing any dampening effect from exchange rate movements. Second, greater reserves may allow governments to smooth consumption in the face of negative shocks.
More precisely, we estimate four different specifications of equation (1) above: (i) with neither exchange-rate regime nor reserve interactions; (ii) with exchange-rate regime interactions; (iii) with reserve interactions; (iv) with both exchange-rate regime and reserve interactions. We also test for asymmetric fiscal responses to positive versus negative commodity-price shocks. The dynamic model is estimated using the Arellano -Bond difference GMM.
6
For each specification, we estimate the response of each of the five fiscal outcomes for several different groups: (i) LICs; (ii) LIC commodity exporters; (iii) LIC commodity importers; (iv) MICs; (v) MIC commodity exporters; (vi) MIC commodity importers; (vii) LICs and MICs; (viii) LIC and MIC commodity exporters; and (ix) LIC and MIC commodity importers. 7 The focus on commodity exporters and importers is motivated by the hypothesis that any impact of increases in commodity export and import prices will be easier to observe in countries that are heavily reliant on commodity trade.
Further, we examine to what extent fiscal outcomes depend on price fluctuations for a narrowly defined set of commodities, and by extension whether hedging strategies based on a 5 All intermediate regimes (e.g., crawling pegs) are treated as fixed exchange rate regimes. 6 Additional lags of the dependent variable were not found to be significant. For robustness, we also carried out fixed-effects estimation of a static version of the model, excluding the lagged dependent variable (detailed results available upon request). The test for asymmetry was carried out by expanding equation (1) to include both positive and negative price shocks. Positive price shocks are those for which the change in prices exceeds the mean plus 1.5 times the standard deviation of the series; negative price shocks are those for which the change in prices is smaller than the mean minus 1.5 times the standard deviation of the series. 7 Owing to space constraints, the results for some groups are omitted. narrow set of hedging instruments might prove useful. To do so, we re-estimate the above regression by replacing the aggregate commodity price indices with price sub-indices for the three most important commodities (the "top-3 commodities"), and for all other commodities (the "non-top-3 commodities"). These sub-indices are again based on the weight of each commodity in the country's export or import basket.
In addition, we present both the short-run impact and the long-run effect of a change in commodity prices on the fiscal variable of interest, where the long-run effect = short-run impact / (1 -).
The forecast error variance decomposition is obtained by taking the variance of both sides of equation 1 above (averaged over time and across countries). The resulting terms on the RHS will include the fiscal variable's own effect, a pure commodity export price effect, a pure commodity import price effect, and various interactions.
Appendix I describes in greater detail the above variables and their sources. Appendix II lists the countries and country groupings. Appendix III provides summary statistics for the key variables.
IV. RESULTS
Overall, cross-country panel regressions suggest a large fiscal exposure to commodity-price shocks, stemming from automatic stabilizers on the revenue side, and a positive and significant response of expenditure, including social spending, to commodity prices. In LICs, and particularly in commodity exporters and importers, the magnitude of the responses is relatively high. Further, in these countries, expenditure tends to respond more strongly than revenue. As a result, we typically observe a significant, positive response of public deficits and debt to commodity import prices in LIC commodity importers, and even to commodity export prices in LIC commodity exporters. The effects are larger under fixed exchange-rate regimes, and persist over time. We now discuss these results in greater detail.
A. Commodity Export Prices and Fiscal Outcomes
All statistically significant fiscal responses to a change in commodity export prices are summarized in Table 4 and Figure 5 . The full underlying baseline regressions are reported in Table 6 -Table 10.   8 , 9 8 Throughout, we carry out residual first-and second-order serial correlation tests (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions (to save space, the AR(1) tests are not reported). The AR(1) and AR(2) tests reject the null of no first-order serial correlation, but fail to reject the null of no second-(continued…) Total revenue rises in response to increases in commodity export prices, as expected (Table  6 ). This response is particularly strong in commodity exporters, where a 10 percent increase in commodity export prices leads to an average short-run increase in tax revenue of 0.53 to 0.61 percentage points of GDP.
10
Expenditure rises in response to commodity export price increases, particularly in LIC commodity exporters (Table 7) . A 10 percent increase in commodity export prices leads to an average increase in public spending of 0.33 to 0.97 percentage points of GDP, with the highest response in LIC commodity exporters. This is consistent with the view that LIC commodity exporters tend to adjust spending as though commodity price increases were largely permanent.
Social expenditure responds strongly to increases in commodity export prices, particularly in LIC commodity exporters (Table 8 ). For instance, in LIC and MIC commodity exporters, a 10 percent increase in commodity export prices leads to an average increase in social expenditure of 0.45 percentage points of GDP. This result is in line with Arze del Granado et al. (2010) .
The response of the fiscal balance (surplus) to commodity export price increases is ambiguous (Table 9 ). In the full sample, the fiscal balance increases. However, perhaps surprisingly, in LIC commodity exporters a 10 percent increase in commodity export prices leads to an average deterioration of the fiscal balance of 0.22 percentage points of GDP; put differently, here expenditure rises faster than revenue. One implication is that commodity price shocks may lead to strongly pro-cyclical fiscal policies. This result is in line with Kaminsky (2010) , Medina (2010) , Villafuerte et al. (2010) , and Cespedes and Velasco (2011) .
In a similar vein, public debt responds ambiguously to increases in commodity export prices (Table 10 ). In the full sample, the response of debt to commodity export price increases is either statistically or economically insignificant. However, in LICs (including LIC order serial correlation, supporting the specification in equation (1). The Hansen J test confirms the overall validity of the instrumental variables at the 10 percent significant level. commodity exporters) public debt rises significantly. This is consistent with the above findings on expenditure and the fiscal balance in LIC commodity exporters.
11 This suggests that achieving debt reduction in highly indebted LICs, and especially in commodity exporters, may be challenging in that policy may be biased toward over-spending the earnings from export bonanzas.
The above discussion refers to short-run impacts. However, commodity price shocks exert even larger effects on fiscal outcomes in the long run, amplifying fiscal exposure and risks (Table 4 ). In the analysis, the coefficients on the lagged dependent fiscal variables are generally statistically significant across groups and model specifications. This evidence of persistence in fiscal outcomes is consistent with the empirical literature, 12 and highlights the fact that commodity price shocks exert a long-run effect on fiscal outcomes.
B. Commodity Import Prices and Fiscal Outcomes
All statistically significant fiscal responses to a change in commodity import prices are summarized in Table 5 and Figure 6 . Again, the full underlying baseline regressions are reported in Table 6 -Table 10 .
Total revenue rise in response to increases in commodity import prices, as expected (Table  6) . A 10 percent increase in commodity import prices is associated with an average short-run increase in fiscal revenue of 0.15 to 0.59 percentage points of GDP. The responses are larger in LIC commodity importers.
Expenditure and social expenditure rise in response to commodity import price increases, again as expected (Table 7 and Table 8 ). The impact is especially large in LIC commodity importers, where a 10 percent increase in commodity import price is associated with an average increase in total expenditure of 0.91 percentage points of GDP.
In LIC commodity importers, the fiscal deficit and debt both increase significantly in response to an increase in commodity import prices (Table 9 and Table 10 ). For instance, a 10 percent increase in commodity import price leads to an average increase in the fiscal deficit of 0.22 percentage points of GDP. Again, all these responses generally build up over time.
C. The Role of Traditional Buffers and the Potential for Hedging
The analysis suggests that policy buffers, including in particular a floating exchange rate and foreign-exchange reserves, can at best partially offset the fiscal exposures of LIC commodity exporters and importers to commodity price shocks (Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 -Table  10 , columns 1A-5A).
Specifically, floating exchange rate regimes partially dampen the impact of commodity price shocks on LICs. When regressing fiscal outcomes on commodity export and import prices, as well as exchange rate regimes interacted with commodity prices, the coefficients on the interaction terms are generally significant, and as expected imply that commodity prices have a bigger impact under a fixed exchange rate regime. That said, the offsetting effects from a floating exchange rate are limited. For instance, a 10 percent increase in commodity export prices leads to a deterioration of the fiscal balance by 0.18 (respectively, 0.26) percentage points of GDP in LIC commodity exporters that have a floating (respectively, fixed) exchange rate regime.
In contrast, there is no evidence that foreign exchange reserves provide any buffering in response to commodity price shocks in LICs. When regressing fiscal outcomes on commodity export and import prices, as well as reserves interacted with commodity prices, the coefficients on the interaction terms are typically insignificant. Further, if both the exchange rate regime and reserves are included (in interaction with commodity prices), the coefficients on the exchange rate regime generally remain significant, but those on reserves are generally insignificant. All this continues to hold under asymmetric specifications, where reserves are interacted separately with positive and negative shocks (detailed results available upon request). As discussed, this may reflect the fact that reserves exert distinct, potentially offsetting effects.
Controlling for the prices of the top-3 commodities, the impact of other commodity prices is on average statistically insignificant (Table 6 -Table 10 , columns 1B-5B). Hedging may potentially be a useful strategy in dealing with commodity-price volatility. However, it is a priori unclear whether hedging on just a few commodity markets would be sufficient, or whether a much larger set of instruments would be required. As discussed above, the shares of the top-3 commodities in total exports and GDP are in many cases large and substantial (see stylized facts), and the top-3 commodities tend to drive the volatility of LIC / MICs overall commodity movements. We therefore estimate alternative models, using the same specifications and the same economic groups, but focusing on the impact of the top-3 versus the non-top-3 commodities. In most cases, the coefficients on the top-3 commodity prices are significant with the expected signs, whereas the coefficients on the non-top-3 commodity prices are generally insignificant. All this suggests that, after controlling for the top-3 commodity prices, the impact of non-top-3 commodity prices on fiscal outcomes is on average limited.
Finally, an alternative way to present these results is to use a simple variance decomposition analysis (as discussed in section III) to assess the extent to which changes in world commodity prices contribute to changes in fiscal variables. Figure 7 shows that, in LICs, commodity export prices account for a large share (typically, about ¼) of changes in fiscal revenue, public expenditure, and government debt; the effects are even stronger in LIC commodity exporters. Commodity import prices, as well as the interactions between commodity prices, exchange rate regimes, and reserves, generally have a somewhat smaller effect.
V. BROADER ISSUES A. "Basis Risk"
The paper has focused on fiscal exposure to commodity price shocks, and the potential benefits from hedging these. However, hedging instruments will likely be based on a limited set of benchmark "world" prices for a given commodity, so as to benefit from more liquid and deeper markets. This raises the issue of "basis risk", which in this context relates to the difference between the benchmark world commodity price and the actual country-specific commodity price, that is, the price which a country receives or pays on world markets for its exports (or imports) of the commodity. These two prices may differ, and the gap may vary over time, for several reasons, including:
 Differences in quality. That is, commodities may not be fully homogeneous, generating a between average world prices and country-specific prices.
 Barriers to trade. These include, for instance, transportation costs (local trading centers may be far from the major global trading centers).
 Imperfect exchange-rate pass-through. Firms with market power may choose to dampen (or, in some cases, amplify) the impact of exchange-rate changes on local prices. In practice, such market segmentation will require the presence of some barrier to trade.
A large literature has examined the transmission of international food prices into local food prices. 13 The broad conclusions are that significant gaps exist, and any tendencies toward co-13 See, for instance, Arias and De Franco (2011) for food-price transmission in Honduras and Nicaragua; Gilbert (2011) for the pass-through from international to domestic prices for maize, wheat, and rice in several LICS; Martin and Anderson (2010) for the impact of trade distortions on the gap between international and local prices; Minot (2010) for price movements in international markets versus markets in nine sub-Saharan countries; OECD (2010) for price volatility in agricultural commodities, and the relationship between (continued…) movements are weak. Most papers, however, only consider a small range of commodities and countries, making their results hard to generalize. Further, their focus is typically on prices movements at the monthly frequency, whereas our interest is more on medium-to long-run developments. In addition, the results may reflect the presence of policy-induced gaps between domestic prices and external prices (for instance, because of tariffs, taxes, or subsidies), which are not directly relevant to the basis-risk issue.
To explore the issue further, we first obtain estimates of country-specific commodity prices for a broad sample of commodities and countries. We then analyze to what extent fluctuations in these country-specific prices are accounted for by changes in the world price of the relevant commodity.
As a first step, we obtain country-specific estimates of the unit value of exports of 40 different commodities using the UN COMTRADE database. Then, for each commodity, we carry out panel unit-root tests on the country-specific commodity prices. Where the unit-root null hypothesis is rejected, we estimate a panel regression of the country-specific commodity prices on the benchmark world commodity price, controlling for country fixed effects.
14 Where the unit-root null hypothesis is not rejected, we instead test for and estimate a cointegrating relationship between the country-specific commodity prices and the benchmark world commodity price, using the Pedroni (2000) heterogeneous-panel FM-OLS estimator.
The results suggest several conclusions (Table 11 and Appendix IV):
 Country-specific commodity prices are statistically significantly correlated with world commodity prices.  However, the correlation is significantly below unity. That is, a given change in world commodity prices is associated with a significantly smaller (proportionate) change in country-specific prices.  World commodity prices only explain a fraction of the overall variation in countryspecific commodity prices.  For almost all commodities, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the underlying timeseries is rejected.  When the unit-root null is not rejected, a cointegrating vector is identified, it typically suggested that in the long run country-specific commodity prices moved one-to-one with world commodity prices.
agricultural prices and prices of crude oil and fertilizer; and World Bank (2009) for determinants of the speed of adjustment of local prices. Most papers use some version of an error-correction methodology.
Interestingly, for crude oil, an a priori relatively homogeneous commodity for which goodquality price data are available, there exists a tight link between country-specific and world commodity prices.
As a general caveat, much of the above analysis relies on unit value data, which may not be fully reliable. Using such data may introduce noise into the estimation, and exaggerate the magnitude of any basis risk.
Nonetheless, this section suggests that basis risk is clearly present. While countries may gain from hedging against fluctuations in world commodity prices, they will still remain subject to significant idiosyncratic fluctuations in country-specific commodity prices. The more heterogeneous the commodity, the greater the basis risk.
B. Commodity Prices versus Volumes
Again, the paper has focused on the potential benefits from hedging commodity price shocks. However, countries are subject to many other shocks, not so easily hedged. As an illustration, this section briefly analyzes to what extent fluctuations in commodity export revenue indeed reflect fluctuations in commodity prices, as opposed to commodity export volumes.
As a first step, we carry out an accounting decomposition of the observed changes in commodity export revenue over various time periods into the fraction due to changes in (world) commodity prices, and the fraction due to changes in commodity export volumes (Table 12) . Overall, the results suggest that commodity prices largely drive changes in commodity export revenue.
Taking a slightly different approach, we also break down the variance of commodity export revenue into its components: the variance of commodity prices, the variance of commodity export volumes, and the covariance terms (Table 13) . Again, these results suggest that fluctuations in commodity export revenue largely reflect fluctuations in commodity prices.
C. Co-movements in Export and Import Prices
This paper has considered separately shocks to commodity export prices and commodity import prices. However, the two are typically positively correlated (Table 14) . This raises the possibility that co-movements in commodity export and import prices may act to either dampen or, conversely, amplify the impact on fiscal outcomes. Which scenario prevails depends on the sign and magnitude of the separate impacts of commodity export and import prices.
In this context, the analysis in section III above yields two relevant conclusions. First, the impact of commodity import prices is often statistically insignificant, except in the group of LIC commodity importers. Second, in this latter group, the impact of commodity export prices is typically statistically insignificant. The main cases where both impacts prove statistically significant are tax revenue, total revenue, and total expenditure in the full sample, which all respond positively to increases in both commodity export and import prices. Put differently, the data suggest that the positive co-movements in commodity export and import prices will if anything amplify rather than dampen the impact of commodity price shocks on fiscal outcomes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper yields several important conclusions. First, commodity price shocks do have a significant impact on fiscal outcomes. Since commodity prices are difficult to project, this suggests that commodity price volatility can increase budget uncertainty, encourage a procyclical fiscal policy, and threaten debt sustainability. The effects are especially significant, both statistically and economically, in LIC commodity exporters and importers. More specifically, tax revenue rises in response to commodity price increases, likely through the direct impact of commodity prices on trade taxes. Expenditure, including social expenditure, also rises in response to commodity price increases. This is consistent with the view that LIC commodity exporters tend to perceive commodity price increases as permanent, and increase spending accordingly. In commodity importers, the channel may be slightly different: increases in commodity import prices may lead to increased spending on social safety nets, or food and fuel subsidies. The fiscal balance deteriorates in response to commodity import price increases. Its response to commodity export price increases is more ambiguous; perhaps surprisingly, in LIC commodity exporters, an increase in commodity export prices leads to a deterioration of the fiscal balance (that is, expenditure rises faster than revenue). In general, not surprisingly, commodity exporters (respectively, importers) are relatively more exposed to increases in commodity export (respectively, import) prices. The effects are felt already within the year, and build up over time.
Second, traditional policy buffers to guard against fiscal exposure to commodity price volatility yield limited benefits. A floating exchange rate regime only partially offsets the fiscal impact of commodity price shocks. There is no evidence that foreign-exchange reserves dampen the effects of shocks.
Third, effective hedging instruments will, in the foreseeable future, likely be available at a reasonable cost only for a few commodities. Nevertheless, hedging instruments based on a narrow set of commodities may suffice to realize most of the potential benefits from hedging. Specifically, controlling for the prices of a few key commodities, the impact of other commodities is on average statistically insignificant.
Fourth, commodity price shocks are sufficiently dominant, relative to volume shocks, that price hedging may largely stabilize export revenue. Specifically, fluctuations in commodity export revenue largely reflect fluctuations in commodity prices.
Fifth, and less optimistically, hedging instruments will likely be tied to a limited set of benchmark world commodity prices, rather than to country-specific commodity prices. As a result, while countries may gain from hedging against fluctuations in world commodity prices, they will still remain subject to significant idiosyncratic fluctuations in countryspecific commodity prices. The more heterogeneous the commodity, the greater this basis risk. This will reduce the overall benefits from hedging.
Finally, positive co-movements in commodity export and import prices if anything amplify rather than dampen the impact of commodity price shocks on fiscal outcomes. Commodity Export Price Index: For each country and year, a weighted average of the growth rate of commodity prices is constructed, using weights given by the ratio of exports of the given commodity to total commodity exports.
Growth of Commodity Import Prices
Commodity Import Price Index: For each country and year, a weighted average of the growth rate of commodity prices is constructed, using weights given by the ratio of imports of the given commodity to total commodity imports.
Commodity Export Price Index (2005=100), Weighted by Total Commodity Exports to GDP: For each country and year, constructed by multiplying the growth rate of the commodity export price index by total commodity exports to GDP.
Commodity Import Price Index (2005=100), Weighted by Total Commodity Imports to GDP: For each country and year, constructed by multiplying the growth rate of the commodity import price index by total commodity imports to GDP. 
